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1Wireless Quantum Key Distribution in Indoor
Environments
Osama Elmabrok, Student Member, IEEE, and Mohsen Razavi
Abstract—We propose and study the feasibility of wireless
quantum key distribution (QKD) in indoor environments. Such
systems are essential in providing wireless access to the devel-
oping quantum communications networks. We find a practical
regime of operation, where, in the presence of external light
sources and loss, secret keys can be exchanged. Our findings iden-
tify the trade-off between the acceptable amount of background
light and the receiver field of view, where the latter specifies
the type of equipment needed for the end user and its range of
movements. In particular, we show that, using a proper setting,
we can provide mobility for the QKD users without imposing
stringent conditions on beam steering.
Index Terms—BB84, decoy states, optical wireless communi-
cations (OWC), Quantum key distribution (QKD).
I. INTRODUCTION
Q
UANTUM key distribution (QKD) is a promising tech-
nology for achieving security in the quantum era [1].
It provides a secure way of distributing secret keys between
two users over an optical channel [2], [3]. The security is
guaranteed by the properties of quantum mechanics rather
than computational complexity [4]. The latter is at the core of
public key cryptography schemes, whose security is threatened
by advanced algorithms that can be run on quantum comput-
ers [5], [6], [7], [8]. QKD offers a solution to this problem and
will possibly be the most imminent application of quantum
technologies in our daily life. It is important to utilize the
advantages of this scheme not only in niche markets but also
for the general public [9], [10]. This necessitates developing
hybrid quantum-classical networks that support many users.
This requires revisiting the requirements at both access and
core parts of the network. This work focuses on the access
networks, and, in particular, it addresses the wireless mode of
access in indoor environments for such QKD networks. This
would resemble a quantum Li-Fi system, possibly, in parallel
with a classical Li-Fi, that enables end users to exchange secret
keys with other network users in a convenient way [11].
The current dominant approach for ensuring data security
over the Internet is based on a combination of public-key cryp-
tography, e.g. the RSA protocol [12], for exchanging a secret
key/seed, and symmetric-key cryptography protocols, such as
advanced encryption standard (AES) or secure hash algorithm,
for encryption, decryption, and authentication. The security of
RSA is, however, based on the computational complexity of
the factoring problem. The latter does not have any known
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efficient solutions on classical computers, but there exists a
quantum algorithm using which one can solve the factoring
problem in polynomial time [5]. This is a huge threat to the
security of our online communications, such as email corre-
spondence and banking transactions, especially considering the
progress made in the past few years in quantum computing
[6], [7], [8]. Note that, although symmetric-key algorithms
such as AES may now be considered safe against quantum
attacks [13], the initial input keys to such algorithms are
currently distributed between two remote users using public-
key schemes, which are vulnerable to quantum attacks. This
would necessitate the implementation of alternative solutions,
such as QKD, at large scale to offer data security to every
individual user.
Since its introduction by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 [14],
QKD has seen many field realizations [15], [16], [17] with the
capacity to generate verifiable security in data transmission
even in the presence of an eavesdropper, Eve, who is assumed
to have an unlimited computational power. In the original
BB84 protocol [14], the light source was assumed to emit
perfect single photons. However, in practice, it is now possible
to use, without enduring a severe penalty, weak coherent
laser pulses to approximate single-photon pulses. The progress
with single-photon detectors has also been tremendous with
quantum efficiencies as high as 93% and dark counts as low
as one per second are now achievable [18]. Such developments
have resulted in QKD being demonstrated over both optical
fiber and free-space channels [2], [3]. Today, various QKD
systems are also commercially available. Examples are Clavis
by ID Quantique in Switzerland [19] and various products
by QuantumCTek in China [20] that contributes to the 2000-
km-long QKD link between Beijing and Shanghai. Other
companies, such as Toshiba Research Europe Limited [21]
and British Telecom who are contributing to the UK national
quantum network, are also heavily involved with the R&D
aspects of the technology. The latter examples represent QKD
networks that are being developed across the world, in order
to support a wider group of end users. The focus of most of
these efforts is, however, mainly on the core networks [16], or
the wired access to such a backbone [22]. This work widens
the QKD adoption by looking into wireless indoor QKD.
Wireless access to a communications network is often taken
for granted. This is not the case, however, for quantum
communications. Most of QKD experiments are fiber-based
in which point-to-point communication is established. In addi-
tion, the single photons enjoy traveling through a very low-loss
channel. Through-the-air QKD experiments have also been
point to point, therefore not offering mobility, and often require
expensive and bulky optics equipment. However, nowadays,
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2wireless connection is a necessity because of its convenience
and also, because of the ever increasing use of handheld
devices. In order that QKD will ever become ubiquitously
used, wireless mobile QKD needs to be developed. While it
is hard to envisage, at the moment, that wireless quantum
access can be offered anywhere anytime, there are certain
scenarios in which wireless QKD can be both possible and
beneficial. For instance, customers in a bank office may wish
to exchange secret keys with the bank wirelessly without
the need for waiting for a teller or a cash machine. While
conventional solutions based on direct optical links do not nec-
essarily provide immunity against skimming frauds, QKD can
guarantee the detection of any possible eavesdropping attacks
[23]. Handheld prototypes have already been made, which
enable a user to securely exchange a key with a cash machine
[23], [24]. It would be desirable to remove the constraint of
being in the vicinity of a bank machine. In such a scenario,
wireless indoor QKD is an attractive solution. In the long term,
such indoors solutions can be part of a home/office network,
which is equipped with wireless optical communications and
is connected via fiber to its main service provider [11]. This
is in line with the developing Li-Fi technologies in data
communications connected to passive optical networks for
high data rate transmissions. Our proposed wireless QKD link
will be using the same infrastructure while complementing
the range of services offered to the user by adding quantum
enabled security.
Wireless indoor QKD would not be without its own im-
plementation challenges. Such a system is expected to suffer
from the background noise, loss, and the implications of the
mobility requirement. Ambient light, caused by the sun and
artificial sources of light, is the primary hindrance to the suc-
cessful operation of QKD in indoor environments. Essentially,
QKD is a noise-dependent scheme, in which a secret key
cannot be exchanged when the noise level exceeds a certain
level. Another possible downside of indoor environments is the
existence of severe loss, in comparison to fiber-based QKD,
when the transmitted beam’s angle is wide. For instance, the
non-directed line-of-sight configuration, which suits most a
mobile user, would suffer most from the background noise
and loss. This is because, in this configuration, the receiver’s
field of view (FOV) should be sufficiently wide in order to
collect sufficient power to operate. This would result in more
background noise to sneak in. A wide beam angle at the
transmitter would also result in a high channel loss, which may
not be tolerable in the single-photon regime that most QKD
schemes operate. Beam steering could be a possible solution
to such problems, but it would add to the complexity of the
system and the cost of handheld devices.
In this paper, we assess the feasibility of employing QKD in
indoor environments by using the known techniques in optical
wireless communications (OWC). One distinctive feature of
the setups we consider in our work is the use of phase
encoding, which, as compared to polarization encoding used
in [23], [24], offers higher resilience to alignment issues.
This would, in principle, enables us to use wider beams and
field of views, which are important factors for the mobility
feature. Under such a setting, we find the feasibility regime
Fig. 1. A wireless QKD link in an indoor setup. The transmitter is mobile,
while the QKD receiver is fixed on the ceiling. For illustration purposes, the
QKD receiver is depicted away from the center. In practice, it should be
optimally placed at the center of the ceiling.
for QKD in a single-room single-user scenario. Multiple
users can also be supported by using relevant multiple-access
techniques [10] [25]. The system is mainly examined in the
presence of background noise induced by an artificial lighting
source, as well as the loss in indoor environments. We also
account for possible imperfections in the encoder and decoder
modules. Our results confirm that there exists a practical
regime of operation where secret keys can be exchanged using
wireless QKD links. Our results specify to what extent beam
steering may or may not be needed. This investigation paves
the road for any experimental realization of wireless indoor
QKD [24].
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Sec. II, the system is described and in Sec. III the channel
model is explained. We present secret key rate analysis in
Sec. IV and numerical results are discussed in Sec. V. Sec-
tion VI concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
In this section, we describe the setup and the components
used in our wireless QKD system. Here we consider a partic-
ular scenario in which we have an empty window-less room
of X×Y×Z dimensions, which has been illuminated by an
artificial source of light; see Fig. 1. While this may not be
exactly the case in a practical scenario, this particular setting
allows us to properly study the resilience of the system to
background noise. More realistic cases can also be investigated
by properly adjusting the lighting source characteristics. The
lighting source is assumed to be a Lambertian one with a
semi-angle at half power of Φ1/2 located at the center of the
ceiling. The contribution of the light source is calculated via its
power spectral density (PSD), denoted by S, at the operating
wavelength of the QKD link, denoted by λ.
We assume that the QKD link is composed of two compo-
nents. The QKD receiver, or Bob’s box, is fixed and located at
the center of the ceiling, while the QKD transmitter, or Alice’s
3device, can be anywhere on the floor with a semi-angle at half
power of Θ1/2. This setting has the practical advantage that
the mobile user is only equipped with the encoder module
for QKD, which is often less expensive and bulky than the
decoder module. With regards to the QKD receiver and the
artificial light source, we assume that the QKD receiver would
just receive the reflected light from the walls and the floor
and no light would enter the receiver directly from the bulb.
This is achievable in practice by using certain reflectors that
confine the radiation of the light source toward the floor. For
simplicity, however, we assume that the lamp position is at
the same level of the ceiling as the QKD receiver, and that the
path between QKD transmitter and receiver is not blocked. We
also implicitly assume that the QKD source shines light in an
upward direction toward the ceiling. This requires a minimal
alignment, which can be done by the users the same way that
a mobile user may avoid being in a deep fading point when
using their mobile phones. If the light beams used are not too
narrow, then the total performance is expected to be tolerant
of some movements. If they are narrow, however, then active
beam steering would be required. We will see what range of
beam angles we can use in our numerical results section. We
assume that the QKD receiver has a detection area A and an
optical filter bandwidth ∆λ. The unwanted light is filtered out
best if the filter’s bandwidth matches 1/T , where T is the
width of the transmitted pulses by the QKD user.
We assume that the decoy-state variation of the BB84
protocol is in use [26]. The key advantage of the decoy-state
protocol is in allowing us to use weak laser pulses, instead
of ideal single photon sources, at the source. This, while
being immune to potential photon-number splitting (PNS)
attacks [27], offers a practical inexpensive solution for QKD
encoders.
We employ time-bin encoding/decoding [28], rather than
polarization, to implement the BB84 protocol. In this scheme,
the information is encoded onto the phase difference between
two consecutive pulses. The possible advantage over polariza-
tion encoding is that we do not need to establish an identical
polarization reference frame between a mobile device and the
receiver. This can much simplify the alignment requirement
and would allow us to use wider beams at the transmitter.
We use passive decoders for our time-bin encoded signals,
which includes a Mach-Zehnder interferometer with a delay
corresponding to the time difference between the two time
bins, followed by two single-photon detectors. The detectors
are time gated so that they only pick up the signal when the
two time bins are interfering.
We consider three cases with regards to the QKD en-
coders. We first assume that the QKD encoding is carried
out perfectly; that is, the phase difference between the two
consecutive pulses is exactly as the protocol requires. We
consider both cases of infinitely many and vacuum+weak [26]
decoy states in this scenario. We also consider the case of
using imperfect encoders. In this scenario, we assume that
the device can be either characterized, in the sense that the
QKD source has known flaws [29], or uncharacterized but
has a fixed deviation from the ideal setting. In the latter case,
we use the reference-frame independent (RFI) QKD protocol
[30], which has also been used in recent demonstrations of
polarization-encoded handheld QKD [23], [24]. The difference
here is that, in the latter experiments, we need to at least know
the reference for one polarization axis. In time-bin encoding
protocols, the equivalent requirement would be to have two
distinct time bins known to the receiver. The latter requirement
is expected to be easier to achieve in practice for users that
carry and move their QKD encoders. Other techniques have
also been proposed to handle the basis mismatch problem,
which may turn useful in certain scenarios [31]. In section IV,
the secret key rate analysis for each case will be given.
We consider the regime of operation when the reflected
pulses off the walls are not overlapping in time with the
main direct signal. This happens when the transmitted pulses
are short in comparison to the transmission delay. This is
the case in the practical regime of operation when high rate
communications is desired. In this case, we neglect to collect
the reflected QKD signals off the walls. We also assume
that none of these reflected pulses will interfere with the
forthcoming QKD pulses. That would imply that the repetition
rate of the QKD link must be on the order of 100 MHz or
lower, which is suitable for our scheme.
Two scenarios are considered in this work. We first look at
the case where the lighting source is turned off in which case,
the background noise is assumed to be isotropic ambient light
noise with a spectral irradiance denoted by pn. The variation in
the receiver’s FOV in this case would affect the corresponding
value of the channel transmittance of the QKD link. In the
second scenario, we consider the effect of the artificial light
source by accounting for the reflections from the walls and the
floor, whose reflection coefficients are denoted by r1 and r2,
respectively. The background noise at the QKD receiver, from
the lighting source, will go up with increase in S as well as
that of the QKD receiver’s FOV. The latter would determine
how much mobility may be allowed. We therefore look at
the trade-off between these two parameters in determining the
secure versus insecure regimes of operations. Before doing
that, in the following section, we first employ the propagation
models in OWC for estimating path loss and background noise
in the room.
III. CHANNEL CHARACTERIZATION
Indoor environments can impose severe conditions for the
operation of a QKD system, such as that in Fig. 1. This
includes the issues of path loss, especially if a wide beam
needs to be used, and the background noise, which also affects
the performance of the scheme by increasing the error rate. In
this section, we estimate the path loss and the background
noise collected by the QKD receiver using established OWC
models.
A. Path Loss Estimation
Due to path loss, the recipient, Bob, would receive a portion
of the photons sent by the sender, Alice. This is estimated by
the channel DC-gain, denoted by HDC, in OWC channels. The
received power depends on the distance between the sender
and the receiver, as well as the degree of directionality and
4the alignment. For the line-of-sight link between the QKD
transmitter and receiver, the DC-gain is given by [32]:
HDC =


A(m+1)
2pid2 cos(φ)
mTs(ψ)
×g(ψ) cos(ψ), 0 ≤ ψ ≤ Ψc,
0 elsewhere,
(1)
where A is the detector physical area; d is the distance between
the QKD source and the QKD receiver; ψ represents the
incidence angle with reference to the receiver axis, while φ
specifies the irradiance angle; see Fig. 1. These two parameters
specify the relative location and orientation of the transmitter
and receiver modules. Ts(ψ) is the filter signal transmission;
m and g(ψ) are, respectively, the Lambert’s mode number
used to specify the directivity of the source beam and the
concentrator gain, given by
m =
− ln 2
ln(cos(Θ1/2))
(2)
and
g(ψ) =
{
n2
sin2(Ψc)
, 0 ≤ ψ ≤ Ψc
0 ψ > Ψc
, (3)
where n is the refractive index of the concentrator, Ψc is the
receiver’s FOV, and Θ1/2 is the semi-angle at half power of
the light source. We neglect here the reflected pulses from the
walls, which, as mentioned earlier, will arrive at a later time.
B. Background Noise Analysis
Two sources of background noise are accounted for in our
analysis. Ambient light noise is considered first, which is due
to black body radiation in the surrounding environment. The
ambient light is assumed to be isotropic. The second source of
background noise is the artificial lighting source in the room.
Let us first assume that the lighting source is off. The
background noise in this case is due to isotropic ambient light.
The received power for such isotropic ambient light is given
by [32]:
Pn,isotropic(λ) = pn(λ)∆λTsAn
2. (4)
The average number of detected photons over a time period
τ , corresponding to the width of a time bin, for each detector
in a passive time-bin decoder is given by:
n
(1)
B =
Pn,isotropic(λ)τηd/2
hc/λ
, (5)
where c is the speed of light in the vacuum, ηd is the single-
photon detector efficiency, and h is Planck’s constant. Note
that the background noise in two consecutive time bins, at the
input of the decoder, would contribute to noise in the measured
time bin at the output of the decoder. The passive decoder
would, however, introduce an additional 1/2 loss factor, and
the background noise is split evenly between the two detectors.
The factor 1/2 in (5) accounts for the aggregate effect.
Next, the background noise at the QKD receiver due to
the lighting source is calculated. The light from the source
can indirectly enter our QKD receiver via reflections off the
walls and the floor. We obtain the amount of reflected power
that may enter the QKD receiver by partitioning the floor
and the walls into surface elements of area dA and then
calculating the contribution from each of these elements at
the QKD receiver. The walls and the floor are modelled as
diffuse reflectors, and we use the model presented in [33] to
approximate the reflection pattern of the walls and the floor.
Suppose the incident and reflected angles that the beams make
with respect to the wall and the floor normal are α and β,
respectively; see Fig. 1. The reflected beams would enter the
QKD receiver if the receiving angle, ψ, with respect to the
receiver normal, is less than Ψc. The portion of this reflected
light that may enter the receiver is estimated by calculating the
DC-gain for the reflected beam, HRef, and is given by [33],
[34]:
HRef =


A(m1+1)
2pi2d2
1
d2
2
cos(ϕ)m1rTs(ψ)g(ψ)
×dA cos(α) cos(β) cos(ψ), 0 ≤ ψ ≤ Ψc,
0 elsewhere,
(6)
where ϕ is the incidence angle with respect to the lighting
source axis; d1 and d2 are, respectively, the distance from
the lighting source to the surface element, and from there to
the QKD receiver; r is the reflection coefficient of the wall
or the floor; and m1 is the Lambert’s mode number, which
is calculated from (2), but with semi-angle at half power of
Φ1/2 for the lighting source (rather than Θ1/2). By integrating
over the walls and the floor, the average number of detected
photons, per detector, at the QKD receiver due to the lighting
source is then given by:
n
(2)
B =
S(λ)∆λτηd/2
hc/λ
∫ ∫
walls,floor
HRef. (7)
Different sources of background noise have different spec-
tral irradiance over different ranges of wavelength. The ambi-
ent light caused by the Sun or an incandescent lamp covers a
wide range of wavelengths and could generate a large number
of background photons within a pulse period. In contrast,
some common artificial sources, such as white LED bulbs,
transmit mostly within the visible spectrum, possibly extended
to the first window of infrared. For QKD systems operating
at 880 nm of wavelength, the latter can then be a more
tolerable source of noise. In order to accurately estimate the
impact of white LED bulbs, we measured the irradiance of
two randomly selected white LED bulbs, with an equivalent
brightness to a 60-W incandescent lamp. The measurements
were conducted by Photometric and Optical Testing Services.
Spectral irradiance measurements have been done at a distance
of 50 cm from the center of each bulb, from which the bulb’s
PSD has been calculated, see Fig. 2. The latter is measured
to be on the order of 10−5 (W/nm) at 880 nm. In this case,
for the parameter values in Table I, the estimated value in
(7), at FOV=20◦, is equal to 1.8× 10−5. This is comparable
to the dark count rate and it turns out, as will be shown
later, that QKD operation can be feasible for such levels of
external noise. The spectral irradiance for the sun is three
orders of magnitude higher than that of the LED bulbs, hence
the QKD system may only work under daylight exposure if
the FOV is extremely narrow. On the other hand, the typical
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Fig. 2. Power spectral density of two LED bulbs, equivalent to a 60-
W incandescent lamp: A 650-lumen cool white LED manufactured by
AURAGLOW (dashed), and a 805-lumen warm white LED bulb manufactured
by INTEGRAL (solid). The wriggly form of the curves at the two far ends
of the spectrum is due to the measurement precision.
room temperature black-body radiation in the room is orders
of magnitude weaker than that of LED bulbs.
IV. SECRET KEY RATE ANALYSIS
In this section, we present the rate analysis for our QKD
system. The secret key generation rate, defined here as the
probability of obtaining a secret key bit per transmitted quan-
tum signal, is one of the key figures of merit for QKD systems.
It will be affected by the amount of quantum bit error rate
(QBER) of the system. The latter depends on the ambient noise
and eavesdropping activities. QBER is defined as the ratio of
non-identical bits in the sifted bits of Alice and Bob and the
total number of sifted bits. In QKD protocols, if QBER is
above a certain level, the protocol is aborted. In this section,
we calculate the relevant key rate parameters for the three
encoding techniques described in section II, in the normal
operating mode of the system, when there is no eavesdropper
present.
A. Decoy-state BB84 with perfect encoders
The decoy-state technique, as mentioned earlier, was pro-
posed in [35] to combat the PNS attack [27]. The idea is that
in addition to the signal pulses, Alice randomly sends decoy
pulses with different intensities. This helps us gather more
information about the quantum channel in order to discover
the presence of Eve. Roughly speaking, as compared to the
signal pulses, decoy pulses often have a lower multi-photon
component, due to having a lower average number of photons
per pulse as compared to the signal pulses. In this case, if
Eve launches the PNS attack, Bob would receive a different
portion of decoy pulses than signal pulses. As a result, if Alice
and Bob examine separately both the decoy and signal pulses,
the attack can be detected [26].
The secret key generation rate for the employed decoy-state
protocol is lower bounded by [36], [26]
Rdecoy > q{Q1(1− h(e1)− fQµh(Eµ)}, (8)
where q is the basis sift factor, which is equal to 1/2 in the
original BB84 protocol. This is due to discarding half of the
detection events in X and Z bases after the sifting procedure.
Here, we use the efficient BB84 protocol [37], which allows
us to choose unevenly between X and Z bases, in which case
q can approach 1. If infinite number of decoy states are used,
the parameters in (8) are given as follows: Q1, which is called
the single-photon gain, is the probability that Alice sends one
photon and Bob gets a click, and it is given by:
Q1 = Y1µe
−µ, (9)
where µ is the average number of photons per pulse for the
signal state and Y1 is the yield of single photons. The latter
is defined as the probability of getting a click provided that
Alice has sent exactly a single photon, which is given by:
Y1 = 1− (1− η)(1− nN )2, (10)
where η is the total system transmittance given by ηdHDC/2
(the factor 1/2 represents the loss incurred in a passive time-
bin decoder), and nN is the total noise per detector given by
nB + nD, where nD is the dark count rate per pulse for each
of the two single-photon detectors at the Bob’s receiver and
nB = n
(1)
B + n
(2)
B ; e1 is the error probability in the single-
photon case, and is given by:
e1 =
e0Y1 − (e0 − ed)η(1− nN )
Y1
, (11)
where e0 = 1/2 and ed models the error, caused by channel
distortions, in the relative phase between the two pulses
generated by the phase encoder. In (8), f represents the error
correction inefficiency and Qµ is the probability that Bob gets
a click, when Alice sends a coherent state with an average
number of photons µ, and, it is given by [38]:
Qµ = 1− e−ηµ(1− nN )2. (12)
The overall QBER is represented by Eµ in (8), and it is given
by
Eµ =
e0Qµ − (e0 − ed)(1− e−ηµ)(1− nN )
Qµ
. (13)
Finally, h(x) is the Shannon binary entropy function given by
h(x) = −x log2 x− (1− x) log2(1− x). (14)
If we use a two-decoy-state protocol, such as vacuum+weak,
Y1, Q1, and e1 are, respectively, bounded by [26]
Y1 > Y
L,ν1,ν2
1 =
µ
µν1 − µν2 − ν21 + ν22
[Qν1e
ν1 −Qν2eν2
− ν
2
1 − ν22
µ2
(Qµe
µ − Y L0 )], (15)
Q1 > Q
L,ν1,ν2
1 =
µ2e−µ
µν1 − µν2 − ν21 + ν22
[Qν1e
ν1 −Qν2eν2
− ν
2
1 − ν22
µ2
(Qµe
µ − Y L0 )], (16)
and
e1 ≤ eU,ν1,ν21 =
Eν1Qν1e
ν1 − Eν2Qν2eν2
(ν1 − ν2)Y L,ν1,ν21
, (17)
where ν1 and ν2 are the average number of photons per pulse
for the decoy states signals; Qν1 and Qν2 can be obtained from
(12); Eν1 and Eν2 are the overall QBER for decoy-state signals
6given by (13). In the above equations, Y0 is the probability of
having a click due to the background and/or dark count noise,
whose lower bound is given by
Y0 > Y
L
0 = max{
ν1Qν2e
ν2 − ν2Qν1eν1
ν1 − ν2 , 0}. (18)
The above lower (L) or upper (U) bounds can be used in (8)
to find a lower bound on the key rate.
B. Decoy-state QKD with known source flaws
We investigate here the case of using non-ideal QKD en-
coders, for which the amount of deviation in state preparation
is assumed to be known. This concerns a user/manufacturer
that has characterized the QKD devices. In order to obtain a
fair comparison with the previous case, we assume that the
quantum states in the Z basis, from which the secret keys
are generated, are well aligned. In this basis, |0〉Z and |1〉Z
represent single-photon states corresponding to the first and
second time bin, respectively. For the sake of modeling the
source flaws, however, we assume that the basis states in the
X basis, |0〉X and |1〉X , are, respectively, given by cos(pi4 +
δ
2 )|0〉Z+sin(pi4+ δ2 )|1〉Z and cos(pi4+ δ2 )|0〉Z−sin(pi4+ δ2 )|1〉Z ,
where δ models the deviation from the ideal state. At δ = 0,
|0〉X and |1〉X describe two consecutive pulses with phase
differences of 0◦ and 180◦, respectively, as expected in the
ideal case.
The asymptotic key rate in this case is given by [29]
R = Q1[1− h(e(1)x )]−Qµfh(Eµ), (19)
where Q1, Qµ, and Eµ are the same as those given for the
decoy-state BB84. The phase error rate e
(1)
x is expressed in
terms of the conditional probabilities as [29]
e(1)x =
Y1X|0X + Y0X|1X
Y1X|0X + Y0X|1X + Y1X|1X + Y0X|0X
, (20)
where, YsX |jX , for single-photon states, in our channel model
is given by
YsX |jX = η[PsX |jX (1− nN ) +
1
2
nN ]
+ (1− η)[nN (1− nN ) + n2N/2], (21)
where P0X |0X = P1X |1X =
1
2 [1 + sin(
pi
2 + δ)] and P0X |1X =
P1X |0X =
1
2 [1− sin(pi2 + δ)].
C. Decoy state QKD with unknown source flaws
If the encoder imperfections are unknown, but correspond
to fixed rotations, we can use the RFI-QKD protocol [30],
instead of BB84, with the decoy-state technique. This case
corresponds to scenarios where the users cannot characterize
their devices and/or the manufacturers have not specified the
extent of possible imperfections in the encoders. In the RFI-
QKD protocol, one basis, Z, is supposed to be known and
identical to both users, while X and Y bases can be different.
In our time-bin encoding, the Z basis is defined by each
of the time-bin modes, whereas X and Y eigenstates are,
respectively, given by superposition states (|0〉Z ± |1〉Z)/
√
2
and (|0〉Z± i|1〉Z)/
√
2 . We model the difference between the
X (Y ) operator on Alice side, XA (YA), and that of Bob’s
side XB (YB) by a rotation parameter ξ, which gives us the
following:
XB = cos(ξ)XA+sin(ξ)YA and YB = cos(ξ)YA−sin(ξ)XA.
(22)
In RFI-QKD, the correlation quantity, C, is used to estimate
Eve’s information, and it is defined by [30]
C = 〈XAXB〉2 + 〈XAYB〉2 + 〈YAXB〉2 + 〈YAYB〉2, (23)
which can be written as [39]
C = (1−2EXX)2+(1−2EXY )2+(1−2EY X)2+(1−2EY Y )2,
(24)
where E terms represent error rates in different scenarios. It
can be shown that C is independent of ξ. For our numerical
analysis, ξ is then assumed to be zero. In this case, we can
assume that EXY = EY X = 1/2, and EXX = EY Y = EZZ =
e1, where e1 is the error probability in the single-photon case
as calculated in (11). The parameter C can then be calculated
by
C = 2(1− 2e1)2. (25)
Eve’s information is bounded by [30]
IE = (1− e1)h[ 1 + νmax
2
] + e1h[
1 + f(νmax)
2
], (26)
where νmax and f(νmax), respectively, are given by
νmax = min[
1
1− e1
√
C/2 , 1], (27)
and
f(νmax) =
√
C/2− (1− e1)2ν2max
e1
. (28)
By substituting (25) in the above equations, IE is then given
by
IE = e1 + (1− e1)h[(1− 3e1/2)(1− e1)]. (29)
The key generation rate for RFI-QKD with decoy-state
technique is then bounded by [39]
R > Q1(1− IE)−Qµfh(Eµ), (30)
where Qµ, Eµ, e1, and Q1 are the same as those given for
the decoy-state BB84 protocol.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we numerically study the feasibility of
wireless indoor QKD by looking at different scenarios. Table
I summarizes the nominal values used in our numerical
results. These parameter values are based on the available
technology for QKD systems. For instance, the values used for
detector efficiency and dark count can be achieved by silicon
APDs [40]. Recent GHz-rate QKD demonstrations have also
used pulse durations on the order of hundreds of ps with a
correspondingly narrow filter at the receiver [41]. We use 0.5
photons per signal pulse, which is the near optimal value for
µ in the decoy-state BB84 protocol. The room dimensions are
representing a typical room with higher reflections from the
walls than the floor, which might have carpeting. In a large
partitioned office space, this can represent one cubicle in the
7TABLE I
NOMINAL VALUES USED FOR OUR SYSTEM PARAMETERS.
Symbol Parameter Values
Φ1/2 Semi-angle at half power of the bulb 70
◦
Θ1/2 Semi-angle at half power of QKD source 30
◦
λ Wavelength of QKD source 880 nm
X,Y, Z Room size 4,4,3 m
r1, r2 Reflection coefficients of the walls and floor 0.7 , 0.1
ηd Detector efficiency 0.6
τ Pulse width 100 ps
∆λ Optical filter bandwidth λ
2
τc
A Detector area 1 cm2
n Refractive index of the concentrator 1.5
Ts Optical filter transmission 1
nD Dark count 1000τ
µ Average no. of photons per signal pulse 0.5
ν1, ν2 Ave. no. of photons/pulse for decoy states 0.1, 0
f Inefficiency of error correction 1.16
ed relative-phase distortion probability 0
room, or the area that can be covered by one QKD receiver. We
also assume a rather large semi-angle at half power for both
the lighting source and the QKD source, which overestimates
the errors we may have in a practical setup. The latter will,
however, be crucial for mobility features.
Before analyzing the key rate performance, let us start by
illustrating how the position of the QKD source and its beam
size, as well as the receiver’s FOV, would affect the path loss.
Figure 3 shows that the position of the QKD source with
respect to its receiver can harshly affect the channel loss. In
our case, moving from the center of the room to one of its
corners adds nearly 10 dB to the channel loss. This is partly
because of the additional distance, but mainly because of the
loose alignment we have adopted for our system. In our setup,
we have assumed that the QKD source emits light upward, at
a right angle with the floor, to the ceiling. There is also the
interplay between the source semi-angle and the total loss. The
lower the source semi-angle is the larger m would be in (1).
This means that for small values of φ, i.e., when the QKD
source is near the center of the room, there may be some gain
in the channel transmissivity proportional to m+1, but once φ
increases, by moving toward the corners, that benefit may be
washed away by the cos(φ)m term in (1). The receiver’s FOV
would also affect the loss in a negative way. One may assume
that a larger FOV would result in higher power collection, but,
quite the opposite, because of the concentrator gain, the larger
the FOV is, the higher the channel loss would be. This is
evident from all the curves in Fig. 3. A larger FOV would,
however, enable the QKD source to be seen over a wider
range. That advantage could, however, come with additional
background noise that may sneak into the receiver. Overall,
Fig. 3 indicates that, without beam steering, the QKD system
may need to tolerate a large amount of propagation loss in the
wireless channel.
In the following, we first assess the in-principle feasibility
of wireless QKD using the decoy-state BB84 protocol with
perfect encoders. We then consider the effect of encoder
imperfections in our analysis.
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A. Secure versus Insecure Regions
In this section, two scenarios of wireless QKD in indoor
environments are examined, and the corresponding secret key
generation rates are obtained using loss and background noise
calculations in the previous sections. In the first scenario, only
the background noise due to the isotropic ambient light is
included. The key generation rate is then presented versus a
range of FOVs as the latter has an impact on path loss as
shown in Fig. 3. In the second scenario, we account for the
background noise induced by the lighting source. In such a
case, the amount of background noise would depend on the
PSD of the lighting source and the QKD receiver’s FOV. In
both cases, we use the decoy-state encoding with infinitely
many decoy states as described in Sec. IV-A.
Figure 4 shows the secret key generation rate in a dark room
when the QKD transmitter is either at the center of the room,
or at a corner. In both cases, the QKD receiver is fixed at
the center of the ceiling. When the QKD source is located
at the center of the room, the system would tolerate spectral
irradiance of ambient noise on the order of 10−8 W/nm/m2,
as shown in Fig. 4. Due to additional loss, the scheme would
tolerate less ambient noise when the QKD source is located
at a corner of the room. The ambient light noise considered
in this case is due to black body radiation in the surrounding
environment, whose effect is calculated via (5). This implies
that the resulting background noise is constant in this case, and
the drop in rate in Fig. 4 is merely because of the loss in the
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system as seen in Fig. 3. The spectral intensity emitted at room
temperature (300 K) from objects, such as the human body, is
expected to be low at the operating wavelength of our scheme.
According to Planck’s formula, the spectral irradiance at room
temperature at 880 nm is on the order of 10−18 W/nm/m2,
which is far below the tolerable amount of ambient noise in our
scheme. This is mainly because we assume that there would
be no sun light in the room, which can adversely affect system
performance. In the case of our window-less room, however,
it is safe to neglect the effect of isotropic ambient noise in our
system. We next consider the effect of the lighting source on
our QKD operation.
When the lighting source is on, additional background noise
would sneak into the QKD receiver. The choice of FOV to
some extent affects the amount of background noise. Figure 5
shows the effect of FOV on the background noise, as well as on
HDC and the overall QBER, Eµ. It is interesting to see that,
at the beginning, the background noise would slightly drop
until FOV reaches near 34◦, from which point it gradually
increases with FOV. For narrow FOVs, the concentrator gain
is rather high, but it sharply approaches 1 when FOV increases.
This can be seen in the behavior of HDC as well. The drop
in the concentrator gain can justify the initial decline of the
background noise. Another contributing factor is that for FOV
< 34◦, the collected power at the QKD receiver is mainly
induced by the reflection from the floor, whereas for FOV
> 34◦, the reflection from the four walls would also matter.
We have chosen much higher reflection coefficient from the
walls (0.7) than the floor (0.1), which justifies the increase in
the background noise. From the QBER curves in Fig. 5 it can
be seen that the QBER is larger than its acceptable threshold
for large FOVs. It is then fair to assume that within the region
of interest for the FOV, the background noise is nearly constant
while the channel gain drops with the increase in the FOV.
Figure 6 shows the secret key generation rate per transmitted
pulse when the lighting source is on and the QKD source is
placed at the center of the room’s floor facing up toward the
receiver. The figure shows the trade-off between the receiver’s
FOV and the PSD of the light source. The higher the PSD
is, the lower the FOV should be in order to improve the
signal to noise ratio at the QKD receiver. This restriction
partitions the x-y plane in Fig. 6 into secure and insecure
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Fig. 6. Secret key rate per transmitted pulse for a QKD source (Θ1/2 = 30
◦)
at the center of the floor in the presence of a lighting source. The decoy-state
BB84 protocol with an infinite number of decoy states and perfect encoders
are assumed here.
Fig. 7. Secret key rate per transmitted pulse for a QKD source with
(Θ1/2 = 30
◦) in a corner of the room in the presence of a lighting source.
The decoy-state BB84 protocol with an infinite number of decoy states and
perfect encoders are employed.
regions. The insecure region is when the lower bound on the
key rate is zero, i.e, when the secure exchange of keys cannot
be guaranteed. The secure region then specifies when QKD
operation is feasible within the setting in our setup. Figure 6
implies that with a PSD of 10−5 W/nm, corresponding to white
LED bulbs, the QKD receiver’s FOV should be less than 7◦.
Figure 7 shows the secret key generation rate per transmitted
pulse when the transmitter has moved to a corner of the room.
We assume that the QKD source has a rather large transmission
angle (30◦), in which case a portion of its beam has the chance
to be received by the receiver. This can possibly be achieved
by a diffuser, if the source beam is too narrow. We assume
that the source is again sending light up toward the ceiling.
Being at the corner of the room, the channel DC-gain is lower
than that of a transmitter at the center of the room. This would
imply that lower amounts of background noise can be tolerated
in this case. The trade-off between the FOV and PSD has been
shown in Fig. 7. In this case, at a PSD of 10−5 W/nm, the
QKD receiver’s FOV should be less than 4◦.
Figures 6 and 7 imply that while there are certain regions
in which secret key exchange is possible with minimal beam
alignment, additional beam steering can substantially improve
the system performance. At the source, this can be achieved
9Fig. 8. Secret key rate per transmitted pulse for the QKD source in a corner
of the room with additional beam steering: the QKD beam is directed into
the receiver with Θ1/2 = 5
◦. The decoy-state BB84 protocol with an infinite
number of decoy states and perfect encoders are employed.
by narrowing the light beam and directing it toward the QKD
receiver [42]. Here, we simulate this effect by directing a beam
with Θ1/2 = 5
◦ toward the QKD receiver, while the receiver’s
telescope orientation is fixed facing downward. As shown in
Fig. 8, the system can now tolerate a larger amount of PSD
in comparison to Fig. 7, where the QKD source is sending
light in a non-direct manner with respect to the QKD receiver.
Alternatively, in this case, one can use a larger FOV at the
receiver, which allows us to cover a larger area for a mobile
user.
B. More practical encoding techniques
After assessing the feasibility of wireless indoor QKD using
perfect encoders, here we study the practical cases presented
in Sec. II. We consider the vacuum+weak decoy-state QKD,
QKD with known source flaws, and RFI-QKD when the source
flaws are not known. We use the results of Sec. IV to calculate
the key rate in each case. Figures 9(a) and (b) show the secret
key generation rate in each case where the QKD source is,
respectively, at the center and the corner of the room. There
is only loose alignment between the source and the receiver,
but here we have assumed a lower PSD for the lighting source
at 10−6 W/nm. In the case of known source flaws we have
assumed 10% error in the X basis, whereas, in the RFI-QKD
case, X and Y bases are rotated by a fix, but unknown, phase.
In Fig. 9(a), when the source is at the center of the room, the
performance in all cases with an imperfect encoder is very
close to the perfect case. This is expected as this case is less
vulnerable to the alignment condition. When the source moves
to the corner of the room, the sensitivity to the FOV becomes
higher, but still with an FOV of 7◦, it is still possible to
exchange secret keys. At this FOV, the drop in key rate, is
around one order of magnitude when we, instead of perfect
encoders, use RFI-QKD. This implies that by the proper choice
of protocol we can make the system quite resilient to possible
imperfections at its encoders.
The above cases illustrate the possibility of using QKD
in certain indoor environments. Whether or not we need
to employ extensive beam steering in our scheme would
depend on the application scenario and its target key rate. One
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can think of certain scenarios in which the amount of keys
generated by loose beam steering would still be sufficient for
the application in mind. For instance, consider a bank customer
that uses an advanced encryption standard (AES) protocol,
supplemented by QKD generated seeds, for his/her banking
transactions. Assuming that each session roughly requires 1 kb
of secret key, the user can store the amount of keys required for
nearly 600 sessions within 100 s in one trip to the bank, where
according to Fig. 6, a key rate of 6 kbps, at a pulse repetition
rate of 100 MHz, can be achieved when the receiver’s FOV and
PSD are, respectively, 5◦ and 10−5 W/nm. For applications
with higher key usage, e.g., secure video streaming, one
may need higher key rates only achievable if the transmitter-
receiver pair are fully aligned. In such cases, one possible
solution is to use docking stations, which ensures alignment
without implementing all the necessary optical elements on a
portable/mobile device.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
We studied the feasibility of wireless indoor QKD in a
window-less room lit by an artificial source. Such systems
could provide the first link within a larger quantum network
or facilitate the use of QKD in common areas for many
users. We showed that there would exist a practical regime
of operation within which such a wireless QKD system could
generate secret keys in indoor environments. We used optical
wireless communications models to characterize the path loss
and background noise in the channel. Our results showed that
with even mild assumptions on the alignment of the QKD
transmitter and receiver, it would be possible to exchange
secret keys if the room is lit by white LED bulbs. Such light
sources have very little power spectral density at the operating
wavelengths of interest for a QKD system, and because of
their low energy consumption are expected to be ubiquitously
used in the future. Our results further showed that additional
enhancement could be obtained if beam steering techniques
were employed.
The type of equipment needed for the above setup is
within reach of our current quantum and classical technologies.
With recent progress in integrated QKD devices [43], [44],
[45], it is possible to think of a portable device equipped
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with QKD capabilities. A handheld QKD prototype has, in
fact, already been implemented for short-range handheld-to-
ATM key exchange [23], [24]. Because of high path loss
in integrated optics systems, the integration requirement for
time-bin encoding may be harsher than that of polarization
encoding. One can, however, think of hybrid solutions where
an integrated dual-rail setup is used for the initial encoding,
which will then be converted to a single-rail time bin encoding
using an external delay line. We also need random number
generators [46]. In many scenarios, we can generate random
bits offline, store them on the device, and use them during
the key-exchange protocol. As for the QKD receiver, we can
use some of the existing technologies for Li-Fi for collection
and alignment. For instance, we can use a non-imaging optical
concentrator, such as a compound parabolic collector, followed
by a bandpass filter at the receiver. The output of the phase-
decoding interferometer is then passed to one of the two
single-photon avalanche photodiodes. Such detectors have also
been considered for use in Li-Fi systems [47]. Overall, with
the progress made toward implementing QKD modules with
integrated optics along with the progress in beam steering
in classical optical communications [42], our proposed sys-
tem can enable high-rate wireless access to future quantum-
classical networks [11].
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